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PART II: PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE
Sol Lovas
The police commit an illegal search. The defendant moves to
suppress the evidence they find because it was obtained through a
violation of his rights. The court agrees, and the evidence cannot be
used against the defendn t at his tral. This is the e,xusionary rule
in action. Contested evidence is excluded if the search violated the
defendant's rights, and it is admitted if no violation occurred; thus
the process of deciding whether to exclude evidence defines the
content of our rights. The content, however, is subject to adjustment
and refinement as courts face new technology, changing philoso-
phies, and varying fact situations. Montana law is no stranger to
change, and this is reflected in the Montana Supreme Court's deci-
sions during the survey period which discuss the exclusion of evi-
dence. This article presents a review of those decisions, with an
analysis of the changes they introduce into the law of the rights
guarded by the exclusionary rule.
I. SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND PRIVACY
The United States Supreme Court effectively rewrote the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures in Katz v. United States:' it no longer prohibits invasions
of "constitutionally protected areas;"' now it prohibits violations of
"the privacy upon which [one] justifiably [relies] .' 3 The Mon-
tana Supreme Court absorbed this change of theory from property
to privacy, and adopted the new approach for use in interpreting the
search and seizure provisions of Montana's constitution.' The Mon-
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 389 U.S. at 351.
3. Id. at 353.
4. The court noted the change of theory from property to privacy in State v. Brecht,
157 Mont. 264, 270, 485 P.2d 47, 50 (1971), held in State v. Finley, - Mont. -, ,
566 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1977), that Montana's constitutional search and seizure provisions,
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (see n. 23 infra), afford an individual the same protection as the
1
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tana Constitution also contains an express right of privacy which
the court applies to search and seizure cases: "The right of individ-
ual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state inter-
est."  The Montana Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Charvat,I
State v. Sawyer,' and State v. Brackman8 were based on these two
concepts of constitutional privacy. They reveal three important de-
velopments: (1) the court's growing acceptance of privacy theories
in the search and seizure context; (2) the court's use of the express
right of privacy to place greater restrictions on police conduct than
are required by the federal constitution; and (3) the evolution of a
search and seizure analysis which integrates the protection afforded
by the search and seizure provisions with the protection afforded by
the express right of privacy.
Charvat illustrates the search and seizure concept of privacy.
An officer seized marijuana plants he found growing in a field. Char-
vat claimed the seizure violated his search and seizure immunities
and moved to exclude the plants from evidence. The court held the
plants were admissible evidence under the "open fields" doctrine,
which provides that any evidence found in "open fields" is admissi-
ble, even if seized without either probable cause or a warrant.' The
court did not just state the rule, however. It went on to explain that
the doctrine's true significance lay in its recognition of the fact that
although a person may subjectively expect privacy in a field, that
expectation is not reasonable and so is not protected by the search
and seizure provisions.' 0 This analysis parallels the approach to the
Fourth Amendment adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Katz." Through Charvat, the Montana court confirmed Katz's
substitution of privacy analysis for property analysis and adopted
a standard for determining what privacy is protected-subjective
Fourth Amendment, and followed the Katz privacy analysis in State v. Charvat, - Mont.
_ 573 P.2d 660 (1978). But see State v. Lane, - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 198 (1977)
(discussed infra, section 1(B)).
5. MONT. CONST. art. H1, § 10.
6. -- Mont. _, 573 P.2d 660 (1978).
7. Mont..., 571 P.2d 1131 (1977).
8. - Mont. _, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978).
9. - Mont. at -, 573 P.2d at 661. The "open fields" doctrine was an outgrowth of
the pre-Katz property approach to Fourth Amendment protection. The Fourth Amendment
protected homes from unreasonable searches and seizures by its very words, but the United
States Supreme Court held in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), that its protection
of homes could not be spatially expanded to include fields some distance from a dwelling.
Therefore the Fourth Amendment's requirements did not have to be satisfied in order to seize
evidence from such "open fields."
10. - Mont. at -, 573 P.2d at 663.
11. 389 U.S. at 351.
1979]
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expectations of privacy which are objectively reasonable."2
Charvat did not rely on Montana's express constitutional right
of privacy, but Sawyer 3 did. Sawyer's car was impounded and thor-
oughly searched to inventory its contents, which included drugs.
The court held that because an inventory search is a "substantial
infringement upon individual privacy," it must meet both the
"reasonableness" standard of the search and seizure provisions, and
the "compelling state interest" standard of the right of privacy."
The state's asserted justifications-protecting the owner's valuables
from theft and the police from claims for lost property-did not
meet these standards, and the drugs were excluded from evidence
at Sawyer's trial. The decision is important for two reasons. First,
the federal constitution permits inventory searches, 5 so this case
marks the Montana court's first major break with the growing con-
servatism of the Burger Court. Second, the decision establishes
that a warrantless search must comply with both the search and
seizure and the privacy provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitu-
tion.
Brackman, on the other hand, was decided solely on Montana's
express constitutional right of individual privacy. 7 In that case, the
police placed a radio transmitter on an informant, who then en-
gaged Brackman in a conversation which the police overheard and
recorded. 8 Brackman claimed that the warrantless electronic moni-
toring of the conversation violated his right of privacy. The court
said that the key to his claim was whether he could "justifiably
rely" on his expectation that his conversation would not be trans-
mitted to others without his knowledge and consent." The court
decided that he could and held that the state had to justify its
violation of Brackman's constitutionally protected privacy expecta-
tion by a showing of a compelling state interest, rather than a show-
12. The two-step formulation adopted by the court was suggested by Justice Harlan in
his concurring opinion in Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
13. - Mont. at -, 571 P.2d at 1133.
14. Id.
15. S.D. v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
16. "We need not consider the Fourth Amendment issue because we view the Montana
Constitution to afford an individual greater protection in this instance than is found under
the Fourth Amendment in Opperman," State v. Sawyer, - Mont .... , 571 P.2d
1131, 1133 (1977).
17. - Mont. at -, 582 P.2d at 1220.
18. During the conversation, Brackman threatened the informant over some money the
informant owed him, thereby committing the offense of intimidation under MONTANA CODE
ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 45-5-203 (1978) (formerly codified at REVISED CODES
OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 94-5-203).
19. - Mont. at __, 582 P.2d at 1221.
[Vol. 40
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ing of probable cause." The court did not agree with the state that
the statutory exemption of public officials from criminal liability for
recording conversations demonstrated a compelling state interest,
and it excluded from evidence the officer's testimony about the
conversations. The Brackman decision is important for three rea-
sons." First, it marks the Montana court's second major divergence
from the Burger court, for warrantless electronic participant moni-
toring is permissible under the federal constitution." Second, it de-
clares that a showing of probable cause will not by itself justify
violations of the right of individual privacy. Third, it continues the
process, begun in Sawyer, of integrating the privacy and search and
seizure provisions of Montana's constitution.
The integration problem is this: both the privacy and search
and seizure provisions can apply to one set of search and seizure
facts. They are, however, stated in two separate sections of the
constitution,21 and the two sections contain different standards for
20. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 1222.
21. The Brackman decision is also important for a fourth reason: its effect on the use
of electronic surveillance in Montana. Brackman's practical effect is that the police must now
obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic participant monitoring if they want to use the
evidence they will acquire, with one clear exception-the police may still "bug" an informant
for his own protection. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 1221. The opinion states that the police may
not use any evidence acquired in this manner, but illegally seized evidence is, as a general
rule, admissible for collateral uses such as grand jury investigations, impeachment, and
parole revocation hearings. The same collateral use rule may apply to evidence obtained
through a "protective bug." See also n. 84 infra.
Brackman does not decide whether warrantless electronic participant monitoring, apart
from "bugging for protection," is ever permissible. The opinion notes only that "[iun all of
the cases examined, none revealed the circumstances were so exigent that the law enforce-
ment personnel would not have had time to obtain a search warrant." - Mont. at
582 P.2d at 1221.
The principal problem facing electronic participant monitoring in the wake of Brackman
is the fact that Montana's search warrant statutes, MCA § 46-5-201 to 206 (1978) (formerly
codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 95-703 to 708), are not readily adaptable to electronic surveil-
lance. Section 46-5-202 (formerly § 95-704 (Supp. 1977)) permits a search warrant to issue
upon probable cause, but Brackman requires a compelling state interest. Under section 46-
5-203 (formerly § 95-705), a search warrant may authorize the seizure of instruments, articles,
or things; but does that include words? Section 46-5-206 (formerly § 95-708) requires the
police to exhibit the warrant when they conduct the search, but informing a suspect that he
is under surveillance destroys the value of the surveillance. Unless and until the search
warrant statutes are either revised or liberally interpreted, obtaining a search warrant for
electronic participant monitoring in Montana is not feasible.
(Compliance with federal statutes is not a problem, because the federal statutes regulat-
ing electronic surveillance specifically exempt participant monitoring from their coverage. 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d) (1976)).
22. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
23. Privacy:
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society,
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 10.
Search and seizure:
4
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judging the constitutionality of police conduct: for privacy, the
standard is a "compelling state interest;" for search and seizure, it
is "reasonableness." To further confuse things, the search and sei-
zure provisions contain the Katz privacy element, which is pro-
tected by that section's "reasonableness" standard. In addition, a
third standard must be considered: search warrants may not issue
but upon "probable cause." This situation presents the court with
the challenge of developing a comprehensive search and seizure
analysis which reconciles these various protections and standards,
a challenge the court is beginning to answer.
The first step is to integrate the protection afforded by the two
sets of provisions. Charvat dealt with the search and seizure concept
of privacy, while Brackman dealt with Montana's express constitu-
tional right of privacy, but both relied on the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Katz in deciding whether the defendant's
expectation of privacy was constitutionally protected. Brackman
followed the "justifiable reliance" approach of the Katz majority;
Charvat followed the "subjective expectation which is objectively
reasonable" approach suggested by Justice Harlan in his concurr-
ence in Katz.' "Justifiable reliance," however, is a conclusion,
while Justice Harlan's approach is a standard for determining what
reliance is "justifiable." Therefore, the latter approach should be
adopted as the standard for deciding what expectations of privacy
are constitutionally protected in Montana.a Adopting one standard
for the two concepts of privacy would unify, as well as greatly sim-
plify, the search and seizure field.
The effect of one standard would be that violations of any ex-
pectation of privacy which fit the criteria would have to satisfy all
three of the constitutional tests: probable cause, reasonableness,
and compelling state interest. This is precisely the double protec-
tion intended by the constitutional convention when it deleted a
phrase relating to privacy from the search and seizure provisions
because it feared including the phrase would permit the higher pro-
tection afforded individual privacy to be watered down in the search
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects from
unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any
person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the person
or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
reduced to writing.
MONT. CoNsr. art. If, § 11.
24. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. Justice Harlan's approach to privacy was adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court in
interpreting Alaska's express constitutional right of privacy. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793
(Alaska 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086.
[Vol. 40
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and seizure context .2 This is also the approach followed in Sawyer,
where the court held the inventory search of an impounded car to
both the "reasonableness" and "compelling state interest" stan-
dards.Y
This brings us to the second step in reconciling the search and
seizure and privacy provisions: integrating the standards for judging
the constitutionality of police conduct which violates protected pri-
vacy. "Reasonableness" and "probable cause" were long ago inte-
grated by the general rule that a search without probable cause is
unreasonable. The integration of these standards with the right of
privacy's "compelling state interest" standard begins with the reali-
zation that neither "reasonableness" nor "probable cause" is a state
interest. The state interest which underlies the search and seizure
provisions is the state's compelling interest in acquiring the evi-
dence necessary to convict criminals. Without evidence, our chosen
system of societal control would fail.z' This interest is not expressed
in the search and seizure provisions, but neither is the countervail-
ing personal interest-individual privacy. What is expressed is the
permissible means through which a state may act to further its
interest: a reasonable search, based upon probable cause and a war-
rant.
Two hundred years ago, that was enough protection. Today, it
is not, as the 1972 addition of the right of individual privacy to
Montana's constitution indicates. The "compelling state interest"
standard, which was selected to safeguard our privacy," has always
incorporated a stringent means analysis, as the United States Su-
preme Court recognized in a decision based on the federal constitu-
tional right of privacy: "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are in-
volved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may
be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' . . . and that legis-
lative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interests at stake .... "3 Both requirements of the
26. The original Bill of Rights Committee Proposal for MoNT. CoNsT. art. H, § 11 read:
"The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects from unreasonable
searches and seizures and invasions of privacy. No warrant .... " (Emphasis added.) The
phrase "and invasions of privacy" was deleted on the convention floor. Transcript of the
Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention 5203 (1972).
27. - Mont. at -, 571 P.2d at 1133.
28. Keeping the peace is one of government's most basic functions. Since we have
chosen an adversarial, innocent-until-proven-guilty system for determining whether an indi-
vidual has defied our prohibition of certain acts, the state must be able to acquire evidence
of guilt even if those who hold the evidence do not choose to release it.
29. The "compelling state interest" standard was adopted on the convention floor after
a lively debate. Transcript of the Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention
5711-15 (1972).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
1979]
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standard must be satisfied.
The Montana Supreme Court applied the "compelling state
interest" standard to a warrantless search in Sawyer3 and
Brackman,32 and in both cases found the search unconstitutional.
Yet the Brackman opinion contains the statement, "[a] decision
in favor of defendant would not outlaw electronic monitoring, but
only impose a warrant requirement before proceeding." A search
warrant, therefore, satisfies the "compelling state interest" stan-
dard. That is as it should be, for the state's interest in acquiring
evidence of crimes is "compelling," and Montana's search warrant
provisions are, in general, drawn narrowly enough to express only
that interest while protecting privacy as much as possible .3
The state's general interest in acquiring evidence should not,
however, be considered compelling enough to justify a warrantless
search. The question in this context is not what will justify a search;
it is what will justify proceeding without the substantive and proce-
dural safeguards of a warrant. Indeed, the heart of the Brackman
opinion was that although the state could have justified the search
if the police had obtained a warrant, the state could not justify the
search in the absence of a warrant. Only two interests seem compel-
ling enough to justify a warrantless search: the state's interest in
protecting its officers, and the state's interest in preventing the loss
or destruction of evidence. Both require immediate action.
It is now clear that the Montana Supreme Court will apply
Montana's express constitutional right of individual privacy in the
31. - Mont. at __, 571 P.2d at 1133-34 (inventory search of Sawyer's impounded
car).
32. - Mont. at , 582 P.2d at 1222 (warrantless electronic participant monitoring
of Brackman's conversation).
33. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 1221.
34. Montana's search warrant provisions are found in MoNT. CONST. art. I, § 11 (see
n. 23, supra), and in MCA §§ 46-5-201 to 206 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§
95-703 to 708). The basic requirements are a judicial determination of probable cause, a
particular description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and reasonable-
ness in the scope of the search. The availability of the exclusionary rule to (1) deter violations
of the search warrant provisions, and (2) remedy any such violations, serves as a further
safeguard. (This suggests that the exclusionary rule may be a constitutional necessity under
the right of privacy, rather than merely a "remedial device." See Calandra v. United States,
414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974)).
Although the search warrant provisions in general are constitutionally valid under this
analysis, some past interpretations of the statutes might fall as permitting too broad an
invasion of privacy (such as the decision in State v. Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 467 P.2d 692 (1970),
that a warrant, which authorized the police to seize "any other property or evidence they
might find that may connect to the demise" of the decedent, was not a "general warrant,"
and hence rot unconstitutional). Any attack on a warranted search would have to challenge
the statutes, but the statutes can be attacked in two ways: (1) "on their face," as-not drawn
narrowly enough to protect privacy as much as possible, or (2) "as applied," as permitting
too broad a search given the facts of the case.
[Vol. 40
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search and seizure context," and will use it to place greater restric-
tions on police conduct than the federal constitution requires. The
next step, necessary to ensure the right of privacy's protection
against police intrusions into our lives and homes, is to fully inte-
grate this new constitutional provision into all phases of search and
seizure analysis. 6 The right of privacy will not destroy police ability
to search and seize evidence. The warrant procedures remain valid;
most warrantless searches are based on either protecting the officer
or preventing the loss of evidence. It will, however, limit the police
to those methods which are necessary, rather than merely helpful,
in their fight against crime .37 Thus the right of privacy is an impor-
tant safeguard to ensure that the police do not step beyond the
bounds of their legitimate duties.
II. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
Montana's express constitutional right of privacy is so new, and
as yet so nebulous, that virtually all search and seizure cases are
decided solely under the search and seizure provisions.3 Even if the
35. For a discussion of the many areas where the right of privacy could be applied, see
Towe, A Growing Awareness of Privacy in America, 37 MoNT. L. REv, 39 (1976).
36. A further refinement of the analysis could be balancing the degree of the invasion
of privacy against (1) the level of justification for the intrusion and (2) the availability of other
means of acquiring the evidence. For instance, the state has a much greater interest in
electronically monitoring a ransom call from a kidnapper than in tapping the phone of a
small-time pusher, even if there is probable cause for both searches. The former case involves
a life-threatening crime with possibly no other means of obtaining the evidence; the latter
involves a less serious crime with better investigative techniques available.
A different balancing pattern is revealed by the suggested approach to search, seizure,
and privacy: as the weight of the compelling state interest decreases (acquiring evidence isn't
as critical as protecting the life of an officer), the stringency of the "means" analysis increases
(acquiring evidence requires a warrant; protecting the officer doesn't).
Remember also that it is possible to challenge the classification of certain activity as
criminal, on privacy grounds (i.e. possession of marijuana, abortion).
37. An example: Under Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the police may search both
the person of an arrestee and the area within his "immediate control" for (1) weapons with
which he might resist arrest or try to escape, and (2) evidence which he might try to destroy.
The underlying justifications for this rule are the two state interests suggested above as
compelling enough to justify a warrantless search. Therefore, the rule survives. What changes
is the permissible scope of the search. Chimel's "immediate control" test has been interpreted
very broadly. See, e.g., United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding
the search of a box in a closet when the arrestee was seated in the middle of the room). The
right of privacy's "means" analysis would limit the police to the least intrusive search possi-
ble under the circumstances.
38. The only search and seizure cases decided so far on Montana's express constitu-
tional right of privacy are State v. Brackman, - Mont. - , 582 P.2d 1216 (1978) (war-
rantless electronic participant monitoring), and State v. Sawyer, - Mont. -, 571 P.2d
1131 (1977) (inventory search of impounded car). A very few earlier cases relied on an implied
constitutional right of privacy. State v. Coburn, 165 Mont. 488, 530 P.2d 442 (1974); State v.
Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971). Some search and seizure opinions mention privacy,
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right of privacy were fully developed, much of the existing case law
on search and seizure would remain binding, since (1) search war-
rants and many warrantless searches would remain valid, and (2)
any search falling within both the privacy and the search and sei-
zure provisions would have to comply with both sets of require-
ments." The right of privacy is not, however, fully developed, espe-
cially with respect to the scope of the protection it affords privacy.
Montana's Supreme Court could select a standard for determining
which expectations of privacy are protected by the express constitu-
tional right which differs from the standard used for search and
seizure privacy analysis. In that event, the right of privacy would
not apply to many search and seizure cases.10 At any rate, unless
counsel presents privacy arguments to the court, search and seizure
cases will continue to be decided solely under the search and seizure
provisions, and the greatest number of such cases involve warrant-
less searches.
A. Search Incident to Arrest
As a general rule, a search must be authorized by a valid search
warrant, or any evidence seized will be excluded from evidence. The
most important exception to this general warrant requirement is
that the police may search the person they have arrested and the
area within his "immediate control" in order to protect themselves
and prevent the destruction of evidence." The Montana Supreme
Court discussed several aspects of this exception during the survey
period.
In two cases, State v. Meadors" and State v. Means, 3 the
search preceded the arrest. The question was whether this reversed
order invalidated the search. The court said in Meadors:
We hold that a search incident to a lawful arrest is not ren-
dered illegal simply because it precedes rather than follows the
arrest. This rule is subject to three limitations: (1) the officer must
without relating it to a constitutional concept. See, e.g., State v. Means, - Mont.
581 P.2d 406 (1978) (discussed infra, section 1(D)).
39. Although the right of privacy, where it applies, will mostly serve to limit the scope
of the search and seizure provisions, it is at least theoretically possible that a search justified
by a compelling state interest may nevertheless be either unreasonable or based on something
less than probable cause.
40. In addition, at least one decision by the Montana Supreme Court, State v. Lane,
- Mont. , 573 P.2d 198 (1977) (discussed infra, section II(B)), suggests that Montana's
search and seizure provisions retain some protection of property interests, which would lie
outside the scope of the privacy provisions.
41. Chimel v. Cal., 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also n.37, supra.
42. - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 903 (1978).
43. - Mont. _, 581 P.2d 406 (1978).
[Vol. 40
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be able to arrest, (2) the arrest must be "substantially contempora-
neous" with the search, and (3) the search must be within the
permissible scope of search incident to arrest."
The court gave its reasons for adopting the rule in Means: (1) the
practical difficulty of ascertaining the time of arrest, and (2) the
practical necessity of searching first to prevent the destruction of
evidence. 5
State v. Jetty6 posed the timing question in reverse: whether a
search which occurs some time after an arrest is valid. In Jetty, as
in the earlier case of State ex rel. Kotwicki v. District Court,7 the
defendant was arrested for a traffic violation and was searched at
the station house before being placed in a cell. The marijuana found
on Kotwicki was admitted. In excluding the marijuana found on
Jetty, the court distinguished Kotwicki on the basis that Kotwicki
could not make bail and so was jailed overnight, while Jetty's bond
was on its way and he was placed in a holding cell only because the
police were shorthanded. 8 Thus the validity of a delayed search
depends on the facts.
The permissible scope of a search incident to arrest was held
by the United States Supreme Court in Chimet v. California" to
extend only as far as the "area within [the arrestee's] immediate
control-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 50
The Court specifically overruled prior cases which allowed a broader
search. 5' The Montana Supreme Court applied Chimel's
"immediate control" test in State v. Cripps5l to invalidate the war-
rantless search of Cripps's car which was conducted while Cripps
was handcuffed outside the car. That was correct, but in State v.
Means,53 the court relied indirectly on the very cases overruled in
44. - Mont. at - , 580 P.2d at 905. The dissenting justice accused the court of
creating a cause of action for false search in cases where the police search first, find nothing,
and do not arrest. Id. at _ 580 P.2d at 909 (Shea, J., dissenting).
45. - Mont. at - , 580 P.2d at 411.
46. - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 1228 (1978).
47. 166 Mont. 335, 523 P.2d 694 (1975).
48. - Mont. at-, 579 P.2d at 1230. This holding that "standard police procedure"
will not by itself justify a full body search parallels the holding in State v. Sawyer, - Mont.
- 571 P.2d 1131 (1977) (discussed infra, n. 68), that "standard police procedure" will not
justify a full inventory of an impounded car.
49. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
50. Id. at 763.
51. Id. at 766. The overruled cases were United States v. Harris, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)
(permitting a four-room search), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (per-
mitting a one-room search).
52. - Mont. , 582 P.2d 312 (1978).
53. - Mont. , 581 P.2d 406 (1978).
19791
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Chimel to uphold the search of the "most likely hiding places" in
the house where Means was arrested, a search which included sev-
eral rooms." That was not correct. Relying on overruled cases, even
indirectly, is not a good practice.
B. Plain View
A second major exception to the general warrant requirement
is the "plain view" rule that any incriminating object which is inad-
vertently discovered by an officer who is legally permitted to be
where he is is admissible evidence.55 In State v. Lane, 6 an officer
standing outside Lane's mobile home saw marijuana plants on the
inside windowsill. He entered the home, arrested Lane, and seized
the plants. The court excluded the plants from evidence, holding
that this was not a valid "plain view" search for two reasons.
First, the court held that evidence found in "plain view" cannot
be seized without a warrant unless there are "exigent circumstan-
ces," that is, circumstances which render obtaining a warrant im-
practicable. Lane was not aware that the officer noticed the plants,
so the officer could have returned later with a search warrant and
seized the plants then. 7
Second, the court said the formal plain view doctrine does not
comprehend "pre-intrusion observation of evidence within a
'constitutionally protected area,' such as defendant's mobile home,
from a vantage point outside the 'constitutionally protected
area.' ,,58 Because the officer spotted the plants before he entered the
home, the plants were excluded. This holding is important not only
because it places a limitation on plain view searches, but also be-
cause its "constitutionally protected area" language marks a rever-
sion to property analysis of search and seizure cases."
C. Automobile Searches
A third exception to the general warrant requirement is that the
police may search an automobile without a warrant if they have
54. The court directly relied on its prior decision in State v. Callaghan, 144 Mont. 401,
396 P.2d 821 (1964) (permitting the search of a basement when the defendant was arrested
on the first floor), which relied on the cases overruled in Chimel, see n.51 supra.
55. See Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Gallagher, 162 Mont. 155, 509
P.2d 852 (1973).
56. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 198 (1977).
57. Id. at -, 573 P.2d at 201.
58. Id. at -, 573 P.2d at 202.
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) marked a change in search and seizure
cases from property analysis of Fourth Amendment protection to a privacy analysis. See the
discussion of Katz and State v. Charvat, - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 660 (1978), supra, section
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probable cause to believe it contains contraband. 0 The Montana
Supreme Court enunciated a major limitation upon this doctrine in
State v. Cripps.11 That case involved a narcotics buy set up by the
police, who then arrested Cripps at the scene of the buy and
searched his car. The court excluded all evidence found in the car
because the state failed to show the existence of "exigent circum-
stances," that is, circumstances under which obtaining a warrant is
impracticable.2 Thus the "automobile exception" in Montana re-
quires both probable cause and exigent circumstances. 3
If a car is impounded by the police, federal law permits them
to fully search the car to inventory its contents, with or without any
probable cause.64 The Montana Supreme Court considered this rule
in State v. Sawyer, 65 but rejected it as permitting violations of Mon-
tana's express constitutional right of privacy6 and stated its own
rule: because the police are only gratuitous bailees of an impounded
car, their standard of care is satisfied by inventorying those items
in plain view from outside the car, rolling up the windows, locking
the doors, and safeguarding the keys." The state's interests in pro-
tecting the car's contents from theft and the police from claims for
lost property do not justify a broader search."
The state tried a new approach to the automobile problem in
State v. Rader."9 The police suspected, but did not have probable
cause to believe, that the furniture in Rader's truck was stolen. The
police stopped Rader's truck and arrested him. The state tried to
justify the stop under Montana's "stop and frisk" statute0 which
permits the police to stop "any person" they have "reasonable cause
to suspect" has committed a crime. The court responded, "[I]t is
60. The United States Supreme Court established the exception in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), because automobiles and their contents can quickly be moved
out of the area. See also Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970).
61. - Mont. - , 582 P.2d 312 (1978).
62. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 314.
63. The decision which adopted the "automobile exception" for Montana, State v.
Spielman, 163 Mont. 199, 516 P.2d 617 (1973), did not discuss the requirement of "exigent
circumstances" implicit in Coolidge v. N.H., 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
64. S.D. v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
65. - Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1131 (1977).
66. MONT. CONST., art. II, § 10, See the discussion of Sawyer, section I, supra.
67. - Mont. at - , 571 P.2d at 1134.
68. The court specifically limited its holding to cases where the sole justification of the
inventory search is standard police procedure with regard to impounded cars. Plain view
searches, searches based on probable cause, the searches with warrants are unaffected by the
Sawyer decision. Id.
69. - Mont. -, 581 P.2d 437 (1978).
70. MCA §§ 46-5-401 and 402 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-719 (Supp.
1977)).
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inconceivable how stop and frisk can be applied to the stop of a
defendant in a moving vehicle."7'
D. Warrantless Search Clause as a Condition of Probation
State v. Means72 presented the court with a new type of war-
rantless search. Means was placed on probation, subject to the con-
dition that "the defendant shall submit himself, his residence and
vehicle to search at any time by Probation Officers, Peace Officers,
or other lawful authorities, without a search warrant and without a
need to show probable cause."' 73 The police later searched Means's
home under the authority of this clause, found drags, and arrested
Means. Means challenged the legality of the search.
The court held that the search was a valid search incident to
arrest, but then proceeded to discuss the validity of the warrantless
search clause. 7' The court observed that Montana's sentencing stat-
ute permits a court to impose upon a probationer any "reasonable
conditions considered necessary for rehabilitiation or for the protec-
tion of society, "5 and found that requiring submission to warrant-
less searches is instrumental in achieving both objectives. The court
then adopted California's philosophy that "[t]he probationer, like
the parolee, has what is euphemistically known as a reduced expec-
tation of privacy."7 In view of this, the warrantless search clause
was plainly reasonable and therefore a proper condition of proba-
tion.
A strong dissent77 argued that probationers do retain a signifi-
cant expectation of privacy, especially since Montana has an ex-
press constitutional right of privacy. The question then becomes
whether the probationer consented to warrantless invasions of his
privacy. The dissenters answered negatively, insisting that consent
71. - Mont. at -, 581 P.2d at 440.
72. - Mont. - , 581 P.2d 406 (1978).
73. Id. at - , 581 P.2d at 407 (quoting the language from the decree of probation).
74. The court said: "As our holding above [on search incident to arrest] disposes of
this case, this issue [the validity of a warrantless search clause] need not be reached in this
opinion. However, we determine that limited discussion of a central facet of this issue is
necessary." - Mont. at __, 581 P.2d at 412. The United States Supreme Court has not
yet ruled on this question, and authority elsewhere is split.
75. MCA § 46-18-201(1)(b)(v) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-
2206(1)(b)(v)) (emphasis added).
76. People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal. App.3d 1058, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (1973) (quoted in
Means, - Mont. at - , 581 P.2d at 413). The court did not specify why it chose to join
California other than to say that the California approach seemed the "more rational ap-
proach." Means, - Mont. at -, 581 P.2d at 413.
77. - Mont. at - , 581 P.2d at 413 (Daly, J., dissenting) (concurred in by Shea,
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is coerced when the alternative to consent is prison."
The precedential value of the majority opinion is questionable
for several reasons. First, although privacy formed the core of the
majority's decision, Montana's express constitutional right of pri-
vacy was never mentioned. Second, the opinion focused on whether
the warrantless search clause was permissible under Montana's
sentencing statutes, rather than on whether imposing the clause
violated Means's constitutional rights. Third, the police had prob-
able cause for the arrest and search in Means, so the court has not
faced the more difficult question of whether a warrantless search
clause will validate searches based upon suspicion or whim. Fourth,
even with such favorable facts, the majority opinion was joined by
only three justices and was accompanied by a strong dissent on the
merits by two justices. Fifth, because the search in Means was inde-
pendently valid,79 the court's statements about the warrantless
search clause are dicta. The question now is whether the court will
feel itself bound by its dicta in Means.
III. PROBABLE CAUSE
With few exceptions, the threshold requirement for a constitu-
tionally valid arrest, search, or seizure is probable cause:ss the state
must be able to show that before the police acted, they had reliable
information which established the probability that a particular in-
dividual committed a crime (arrest), or that particular evidence was
at a particular place (search and seizure). The principal sources of
this information are police observations and informants' tips.
If the only basis for probable cause is an informant's tip, federal
constitutional law requires the police to provide the judge with the
facts and circumstances (1) upon which the informant based his
conclusions, and (2) from which the judge can determine whether
the informant is reliable."' The Montana Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Leistikol2 modified this rule by distingushing between
78. Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 416.
79. See n. 74 supra.
80. The warrantless search clause situation is one possible exception. The others are
"stop-and-frisk," see MCA §§ 46-5-401 and 402 (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-719
(Supp. 1977)), plain view searches, see State v. Lane, - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 198 (1977),
and consent searches, see MCA § 46-5-101 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-
701).
81. Aguilar v. Tex., 378 U.S. 108 (1964). If the police are applying for a search warrant,
the facts must be in the application for the warrant. See State v. Leistiko, - Mont; __,
578 P.2d 1161 (1978) (search warrant). If the police are justifying a warrantless arrest or
search, the facts must be revealed by testimony at the suppression hearing. See State v.
Robey, - Mont. -, 577 P.2d 1226 (1978) (warrantless arrest).
82. - Mont. -, 578 P.2d 1161 (1978).
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two types of informants.8 "Citizen-informants" are victims or wit-
nesses of crime, who act out of citizenship; they are reliable.
"Informants" act for other reasons and must be proven reliable. The
court warned that the label "citizen-informant" is just as conclusive
as the label "reliable," but it appears from this decision that the
proof of reliability requirement is satisfied by proof of "citizen-
informant" status. 84
The other principal source of probable cause information is
police observations. Two Montana cases in the early 1970s deter-
mined that an officer's perception of the odor of burning marijuana
tends to establish probable cause to believe someone is committing
an offense in the officer's presence, thus justifying a warrantless
arrest.1 The question raised in State v. Schoendaller was whether
the odor of burning or burnt marijuana, by itself, establishes such
probable cause. The court said "such perception falls closer to the
realm of suspicion than probable cause" ' and excluded all evidence
found through the search incident to Schoendaller's consequently
illegal arrest.
In State v. Rader, " the police arrested Rader because an officer
thought the furniture in Rader's truck belonged to his friend. Only
later did the friend report that his furniture had been stolen." The
court excluded the furniture from evidence for lack of probable
cause for the arrest. In essence, the case says that until the police
have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, they
cannot have probable cause that anyone committed it.
83. Id. at -, 578 P.2d at 1164.
84. A different question about how one may prove an informant's reliability is prompted
by the court's holding in State v. Brackman, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978), that an
informant may be "bugged" for his own protection when he meets a suspect. See n. 21, supra.
Brackman says that the police cannot use any evidence obtained through the "protective
bug," but can the police testify as to what they heard through the "bug" in order to verify
that the informant's report is accurate?
85. State v. Bennett, 158 Mont. 496, 493 P.2d 1077 (1972); State v. Hull, 158 Mont. 6,
487 P.2d 1314 (1971).
86. - Mont. - , 578 P.2d 730 (1978).
87. Id. at -, 578 P.2d at 734. This conclusion that odor alone is not sufficient to
establish probable cause was confirmed by the court in State v. Means, - Mont. -, 581
P.2d 406 (1978):
It is clear that Hull and Bennett stand for the proposition that the odor of
burning or burnt marijuana, together with other facts tending to establish probable
cause, is sufficient justification for an officer to enter for the purpose of effectuating
an arrest and searching incident thereto.
Id. at -, 581 P.2d at 409 (emphasis added).
88. - Mont. -, 581 P.2d 437 (1978).
89. The friend checked his cabin to see if his furniture had been stolen only because
his officer friend called and asked him about it.
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IV. CONFESSIONS
Once there is a valid arrest based upon probable cause, the
question arises whether an arrestee's statements to the police are
admissible evidence. The United States Supreme Court held in
Miranda v. Arizona" that statements made by a person in custody
must be excluded unless the state can prove (1) that the police fully
informed him of his rights to counsel and silence (the Miranda
warning), and (2) that he waived his rights.
The court emphasized the importance of a proper Miranda
warning in State v. Johnson" by holding that testimony that John-
son was "given his rights" was not sufficient proof of a proper warn-
ing, because it did not indicate what Johnson was told about his
rights. That being the only evidence of a warning, Johnson's subse-
quent confession was suppressed.
The seventeen-year-old defendant in State v. District Court 2
was properly warned, but both he and his mother signed written
waivers before he made any incriminating statements. The court
voided the waivers because of two Montana statutes which provide
that if a juvenile is charged with a felony, neither he nor his parents
may waive counsel. 3 This contrasts sharply with the earlier case of
State v. Braden," in which the court held that a seventeen-year-old
defendant effectively had waived counsel. One difference between
the two cases is that only one of the two statutes was in effect when
Braden was decided." Another is the difference in the records. The
record in Braden revealed that the defendant was very bright, with
extensive experience in the criminal justice system. The court con-
cluded he was not one of the "young and unwary" whom the stat-
utes were meant to protect and refused to apply them." The record
in District Court revealed only that the defendant was known to be
90. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The rule is based on the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination, U.S. CONST. amend. V, but also protects a defendant's right to counsel,
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
91. - Mont. 580 P.2d 1387 (1978).
92. - Mont. 577 P.2d 849 (1978).
93. MCA § 41-5-511 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(3) (Supp.
1977)): "Neither the youth nor his parent or guardian may waive counsel if commitment to
a state correctional facility or to the department of institutions for a period of more than 6
months may result from adjudication."
MCA § 46-8-102 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1002): "A defendant may
waive his right to counsel except that in all felony cases where the defendant is under eighteen
(18) years of age the defendant shall be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceed-
ings."
94. 154 Mont. 90, 460 P.2d 85 (1969).
95. Braden, id., was decided in 1969, while MCA § 41-5-511 (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(3) (Supp. 1977)) was passed in 1974. Ch. 329, § 18, Laws of
Montana (1974).
96. 154 Mont. at 91, 460 P.2d at 86.
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a juvenile offender." It can still be argued that Braden establishes
an exception to the statutory rule, but the force of that argumenthas -een diminihed by the passage of the second protective statute
and the decision in District Court.
Most confession cases are like District Court in that they con-
cern statements made to the police after an arrest, but federal cases
hold that Miranda must be satisfied even where the purpose of the
custody is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation, and the
interrogator does not presently intend to initiate a criminal prosecu-
tion." These federal cases provided the authority for the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Harris," in which the question
was whether the statements Harris made at his cellmate's prison
disciplinary hearing were admissible at Harris's subsequent trial,
even though he was neither given a Miranda warning nor criminally
charged until after the hearing. The court excluded the state-
ments. 100
V. INITIAL APPEARANCE
All of the cases reviewed above discussed the exclusion of evi-
dence in the context of constitutional rights. State v. Benbo"'° illus-
trates that the exclusionary rule also protects statutory rights. After
Benbo was arrested and given a Miranda warning, he made incrimi-
nating statements and led the police to stolen guns. Under Mon-
tana's initial appearance statutes,0 2 every person arrested must be
taken before a judge without unnecessary delay, to be judicially
advised of his rights and the charges against him. Benbo had had
no initial appearance. The court first noted that the purpose of an
initial appearance is not only to ensure the voluntariness of confes-
sions, but also to guarantee a judicial reading of rights and
charges. 0 3 Stating "[iut is time to recognize the importance of this
right," the court held that an unnecessary delay between arrest and
97. - Mont. at -, 577 P.2d at 851-52.
98. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (I.R.S. agent questioned Mathis in
jail cell); United States v. Redfield, 402 F.2d 454 (4th Cir. 1968) (statement at prison discipli-
nary hearing).
99. __ Mont. -, 576 P.2d 257 (1978).
100. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 258. The court did not express its reasoning clearly. A
second basis for the court's holding was its conclusion that the prison's rules specifically
barred such use of statements made at a disciplinary hearing. Id.
101. - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 894 (1977).
102. MCA §§ 46-7-101 and 102 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 95-901 and
902). Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrestee must be given a probable cause hearing
before he can be held for any extended period of time. Gerstein v. Pugh, 320 U.S. 103 (1975).
Montana's initial appearance, however, does not serve as a probable cause hearing; therefore
it remains a purely statutory requirement.
103. - Mont. at -, 570 P.2d at 899.
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initial appearance requires the exclusion of "all evidence obtained
during [the] 'unnecessary delay' except that which . . . has no
reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever."'04 The opinion
also set out the burden of proof: the defendant must prove the delay
was unnecessary; then the burden shifts to the state to prove that
its acquisition of the evidence was not reasonably related to the
delay. The state failed to sustain its burden in Benbo, since the
defendant might well have acted differently had a judge explained
his situation to him.'05 His statements, and the guns to which he led
the police, were excluded from evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although no workable alternative to the exclusionary rule ex-
ists,'"0 the rule is under attack. The federal courts used to view it as
an integral part of the Fourth Amendment's guarantees; now they
relegate it to the lowly status of a "remedial device,"'0 7 designed
solely to deter illegal police conduct.'08 Even as a remedy, it has less
than unanimous support.'"0 The Montana state legislature has at-
tempted to abolish it by statute, though so far without success. "1
In the courts of Montana, however, the exclusionary rule is secure
in its role as guardian of rights. Its role in Montana has expanded,
particularly with respect to the right of privacy and statutory rights,
to the point where the Montana version of the rule affords an indi-
vidual greater protection than does its federal counterpart."' The
104. Id. at - , 570 P.2d at 900 (quoting the rule from Pa. v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 394,
290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972) (omissions by the court). This approach was first developed by the
federal courts with respect to the federal statutory equivalent to an initial appearance. See
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
The McNabb-Mallory rule was abolished by Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1976).
105. Benbo's situation was confusing. The complaint with which he was served stated
the crime of theft, because Benbo was charged with receiving stolen guns. He did not start
talking, though, until after the arresting officers told him they knew he didn't steal the guns.
106. The major reason why the United States Supreme Court held that the state courts
must apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights was
that other remedies were virtually worthless as a means of ensuring that the police stay within
their constitutional powers. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) with Calandra v. United States,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
108. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
109. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., S. 217, 46th Legislative Sess. (1979); S.314, 44th Legislative Sess. (1975).
These bills have sought to replace the exclusionary rule with criminal, civil, and administra-
tive remedies. The constitutionality of such efforts is debatable.
111. See, e.g., State v. Brackman, - Mont. , 582 P.2d 1216 (1978) (warrantless
electronic participant monitoring); State v. Sawyer, - Mont. - , 571 P.2d 1131 (1977)
(inventory search of impounded car); State v. Benbo, _L Mont. - , 570 P.2d 894 (1977)
(initial appearance).
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Montana and federal constitutions limit the power of the police in
order to protect us from the unrestrained exercise of police discre-
tion. Without the exclusionary rule, these constitutional limitations
would have no substance. We would be subject to police whim and
caprice. With it, our rights are well guarded.
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